Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (cases filed before 1965)

1965

Citizens Casualty Company v. George L. Hackett :
Brief of Respondent

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Irwin Arnovitz; Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Citizens Casualty v. Hackett, No. 10334 (1965).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/4820

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (cases filed before 1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
CITIZEN'S CASUALTY
COMPANY,
Pmintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No.
10334

GEORGE L. HACKETT,
Defendant and Appell,ant,
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
Appeal From the Judgment and Order of the
Third District Court for Salt Lake County,
Honorable Ferdinand Erickson, Presidinc
WHITE, ARNOVITZ & SMITH
913 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for
Pl,aintiff and Resp<mdent

~ ~

LED

GORDON A. MADSEN
Mabey, Ronnow, Madsen & Maisden
·
574 East Second South
NOV 2 6 1965
Salt Lake City, Utah
- ----·-----------------·------------------------·-.._.._...
~lo. k. Supreme Court, Utah
Attorneys for
Defendant-Appell,ant

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
STATEMENT OF FACTS________ ____________________ __________
1
ARGUMENT________________________________________________________________________
7
POINT 1. REPLY TO APPELLANT'S POINT 1-A.____
POINT 1-B. REPLY 'TO APPELLANT'S POINT 1-B._
POINT 2. DISCUSSION OF APPELLANT'S POINT 2
"THAT NO CONTRACT OF INSURANCE WAS
EVER CONSUMMATED GIVING RISE TO A
CAUSE OF ACTION." -------------------------------------------POINT 3. REPLY TO POINT 3 OF APPELLANT'S
ARGUMENT -------------------------------------------------------------POINT 4. DISCUSSION OF APPELLANT'S POINT
4.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------POINT 5. PLAINTIFF FULLY MET ITS BURDEN
OF PROOF. ---------------------------------------------------------------CONCLUSION -------------------------------------------- --------------------

7
9

13
19
23
24
27

CASES
Citizens Casualty Co. vs. Keith J. Coons & Geo. Hackett # 12763 Third District Court. -----------------------Kidder vs. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 126
Wash. 475; 219 P. 220 at 221 -------------------------------Ross vs. Producers Ins. Company, 4 Utah 2nd, 396
295 P.2, 339 -----------------------------------------------------------Sweetser vs. Fox, 43 Ut. 40, 134 P. 599 at 6021 -------Way vs. Pacific Lbr. & Timber Co., 74 Wash. 332;
133 P. 595, 49 L.R.A. (N.S.) 147 -------------------- -------

7
11
10
8
11

STATUTES
Sec. 31-19-9 ( 1) U.C.A. '53 ------------------------------ ------------Sec. 31-1-6, U.C.A. '53 ------------------------------------------ --------(After this, page 342 of 295 Pac.2 is mentioned)
Sec. 31-19-35, U.C.A. '53 -------------------- --------------------------Sec. 31-17-22 ( 3) U.C.A. '53 ---------------------------------------Utah Insurance Code, 31-19-10 ----------------------------------------

9
10
11
26
12

TEXTS
29 Am. Jur. 587, Sec. 196 _____________ ------ -------------------

19

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
CITIZEN'S CASUALTY
COMPANY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
GEORGE L. HACKETT,
Defendant and Appellant,

Case No.
10334

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Respondent will set out a more detailed
statement of the facts than has the Appellant, as
the statement of facts by the Appellant is sketchy,
and in some particulars inaccurate.
The plaintiff, Citizens Casualty Company is
an insurance company of the State of New York,
writing public liability and property damage insurance on motor vehicles. The company was represented in Utah by George Hackett, the defendant,
as an agent or broker.
1

George Hackett solicited insurance from Paul
W. Nielson, d/b/a Nielson Trucking Company. On
or about October 24, 1958, Nielson placed an order
with Hackett for a policy of insurance for coverage of bodily injury liability and for property damage. Hackett placed a telephone call to a Mr. Blum
of Los Angeles who represented the Citizens Casualty Company and requested him to contact the New
York Office of the plaintiff and obtain liability
and property damage cove1·age for the Nielson Company. On the same date, plaintiff sent a telegram
to the defendant (Ex. P-14) stating that at the request of Blum, plaintiff would accept the risk and
were "binding Nielson Trucking Company as of
October 27, 1958 with Policy CGA 1103" and the
telegram also stated that the Citizens Casualty Company, on that date, wired the Interstate Commerce
Commissison and the Utah Public Service Commission to that effect. Copies of the telegram sent to
the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Utah
Public Service Commission are a part of Exhibits
P-14. The telegram also stated that on Monday,
October 27, 1958 the plaintiff would telegraph the
regulatory bodies in the remaining states in which
the Nielson Trucking Company was operating its
trucks and inform the regulatory bodies of those
states, that it was binding this risk.
At about the same time Nielson requested cargo
insurance from Hackett. Cargo insurance was placed
by Hackett with the Firemen's Fund Insurance Com2

pany (Ex. 7). The insurance coverage provided by
that policy, MTR 11181, is "for loss or damage to
lawful goods and merchandise while on vehicles
operated by Nielson". The policy called for a premium rate of 60¢ per $100.00 of gross receipts. The
liability and property damage coverage provided by
the plaintiff was in effect from October 27, 1958
to April 7, 1959.
The premium rates on both policies was based
on gross receipts of the Nielson Trucking Company
in its trucking operations. Hackett obtained a premium deposit of $1000.00 cash and a promissory
note for $4137.60 on December 4, 1958 (Ex. D-18)
providing for monthly payments of $689.60.
In order that the monthly premium could be
computed, the Nielson Company made monthly reports of its gross receipts beginning with the date
October 25, 1958. A tabulation of the premiums
developed on both the liability and property damage
policy and the cargo insurance measured by these
gross receipts appears in Exhibit P-13 and are as
follows:
$ 391.95
October, 1958
1397.72
November, 1958
1560.32
December, 1958
1529.37
January, 1959
2275.84
February, 1959
777.50
March, 1959
Total

$6932.70

In this Exhibit P-13, Hackett acknowledges that he
3

received these sums from Nielson to be applied to
the two original policies, based on gross receipts.
The cargo policy rate was 60¢ per $100.00 of gross
receipts. The total gross receipts for the period
October 25, 1958 to April 7, 1959 was $157,670.16
(See adding machine tape attached to Ex. D-9) producing a premium of $943.00 on the cargo insurance
leaving premiums on the policy in question of the
difference or $5989. 70. This premium belonged to
the plaintiff but the defendant did not pay this
over to the plaintiff. If the amounts had been paid
over to the plaintiff, the plaintiff would have been
obliged to pay the defendant a commission of 22 ;~
or $1317. 74. Allowing this commission to the defendan t, the defendant should have paid over to the
plaintiff the net amount of $4671.96. Accordingly,
the lower court entered a judgment in favor of the
plaintiff for the sum plus interest.
'il,,>

A notice of r.;>ncellation of the coverage of the
plaintiff was sent on March 6, 1959 becoming effective on April 7, 1959 (Ex. P-16). Notice of this
cancellation was sent to all of the regulatory agencies to which binders had been sent and these are
listed in this exhibit, being the Interstate Commerce
Commission and the regulatory bodies of the states
of Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Nevada,
Oregon, Utah and Wyoming.
We wish to direct the court's attention to some
incorrect statements which Appellant has inter4

spersed in his ai·gument. They are:
That all monies received by defendant from
Nielson were in fact ultimately applied on insurance
coverage with companies other than the plaintiff.
(Appellant's Brief - Page 24).
1.

2. That at the termination of Appellant's dealings with the Nielson Trucking Company, the Appellant had in fact expended some $3,000.00 more
on insurance coverage than Nielson paid for. (Appellant's Brief - Page 25).
Each of these statements purporting to be facts,
is incorrect. A correct statement of fact would be
that all monies in excess of $5989. 70 were in fact
utimately applied on insurance coverage with companies other than the plaintiff. This will be demonstrated in the discussion that follows.
Appellant's counsel states that it is a fact that
"at the termination of defendant's dealing with
Nielson Trucking Company, defendant had in fact
expended some $3,000.00 more on insurance coverage than Nielson paid and was compelled to file a
claim for said amount with the Receiver of Nielson
Trucking Company". (Appellant's Brief - - Page
25). That statement is in essence a repitition of the
statement made by Appellant in his Brief at Page 5,
as follows: "Nielson Trucking Company in 1960
went into involuntary receivership and Exhibit P-12
which constitutes a running ledger of Nielson's
truck account with George L. Hackett & Company,
5

shows a balance due and owing by Nielson in the
amount of $3285. 75 for which defendant made a
claim in the Receivership (Exhibit P-12)". (Appellant's Brief, Page 5). The fact is that Hackett's
claim against Nielson was for only $363.08. This
overcharge results from the fact that when Hackett
filed his claim in the Receivership Proceedings, he
made a charge of $2922.67 that should not have
been made. This is evident from on inspection of
the last entry on Page 1 of Exhibit P-12 which
reads: "4-7-59, Reference 2197, Gross Receipts deposit premium $2922.67". On that date, namely,
April 7, 1959 the Citizens Casualty policy was cancelled and Mr. Hackett replaced that policy with one
issued by another company. He then charged the
monthly premiums on the account as they accrued.
Since the premiums during the entire period when
the policy was in force have been charged as debits
on Page 1 of Exhibit 13, it is improper to add the
deposit premium of $2922.67 as a charge. This
results in the overcharge of the sum of $2922.67.
Thus, the total charged to Nielson should be
reduced by $2922.67 making the correct figure for
total charges $17,023.32 and the total payments by
Nielson were $16,660.24 leaving Nielson owing
Hackett just $363.08.
The facts then are that Hackett was paid his
entire premium charges down to the last charge
of $1110.02 that accrued for the month of November 1959 on the successor liability and property
'
6

dama.ge policy and Hackett even received $746.94
to be applied against that final charge, leaving only
an outstanding balance due to him of $363.08.
ARGUMENT
REPLY TO APPELLANT'S POINT 1-A

Appellant in his Point I argues that his Motion
to Dismiss should have been granted (a) on the
grounds of res judicata. The basis of the Motion
was that a judgment had been entered in a case
entitled Citizens Casiialty Cornpany v. Keith J.
Coons ancl George Hackett, # 127263 in the Third
District Court and that judgment was an adjudication of the issues in this case. In that case plaintiff
sued Keith J. Coons for the premiums on a policy
of insurance written through the defendant Hackett's Agency, on Policy Form 380C-3-58. The defendant Coons, had pleaded that he had paid Hackett
and that was the reason for joining him as a party
defendant in that suit. A judgment was entered in
favor of Coons on finding being made that he had
paid Hackett. The court made a finding in that
case that there was no evidence of an insurance
binder having been issued by the plaintiff and the
court's conclusion of law was that no contract of
insurance ever becrine effective and plaintiff was,
therefore, not entitled to collect the premium. (Page
9 of Appellant's Brief) In this case the court made
a finding that: "The plaintiff wired the defendant
that it was binding the Nielson Trucking Company"
( R-11). The facts in the two cases are different. In
7

the Coons case the finding was that the1·e was no
policy of insurance - in the instant case that there
was an effective binder.
In the Coons case, plaintiff made a Motion for
a new trial which has never been disposed of. Accordingly, there is no final judgment in the Coons
case which may be used as evidence for the purpose
of establishing a plea of res judicata. See Sweetsa
v. Fox, 43 Utah 40, 134 P. 599 at 6021 It has accordingly repeatedly been held in that
state that a judgment roll may not be used
as evidence for the purpose of establishing
pleas of estoppel or res judicata pending an
appeal or during the time an appeal can be
taken. The correctness of that doctrine may
be conceded, and yet it in no way militates
against the fact that a judgment may nevertheless be used as evidence for some purpose
othe1· than estoppel and res judicata. The
reason why a judgment roll pending an appeal or during the time when one may be taken may not be used as evidence of an estoppel or res judicato of any particular fact or
facts involved in the litigation which terminated in the judgment evidenced by the judgment roll is palpably obvious. So long as the
judgment may be modified or reversed UJ.?OD
a direct proceeding on appeal 01· otherw~se,
the facts that were involved in the litigat10n
cannot be said to be res judicata. That is, they
are not finally fixed and determined, but are
still subject to be changed or entirely overthrown.
This is a complete Answer to Appellant's Point
1-(A).
8

1-B - Appellant quotes Section 31-19-9 ( 1)
UCA 53 evidently contending that if a policy of
insurance is written on a policy form which has
not been approved by the Insurance Commissioner,
that an insurance company cannot collect the premiums from the insured. This case is not a suit by
an insurance company to recover a premium from
its insured. The insured paid the premium to Hackett, the defendant, who, instead of paying it over
to the insurance company, kept the premium as his
own and the insurance company is here only asking
for the insurance premium which the agent, Hackett,
has kept as his own. Before proceeding to a statement of the law on this point, we quote the concluding sub-division of this section of the Statute:
Sub-Division 5 - The Commissioner may, by
01·der, exempt from the requirements of this
section, for so long as he deems proper, any
insurance document or form or type thereof
as specified in such order to which in his opinion this section may not practicably be applied or the filing and approval of which are,
in his opinion, not desirable or necessary for
the protection of the public.
We quote this section only to show that no great
significance is attached to this particular requirement of the insurance code.
If this case were one for the recovery of a pre-

mium from the insured, the failure to file a form
with the Insurance Commissioner would not bar
the insurance company's right to recover. See Ross
9

v. Producers Mutual Insurance Conipany, 4 Utah
2d, 396, 295 P. 2cl, 339. This court has held that
even though there be sanctions imposed for a violation of the insurance code, Section 31-1-6 UCA 53
nevertheless holds the violation of the statute does
not void the contract of insurance. The court at
Page 3421 of 295 P. 2d, states:
Williston concludes that no agrement should
be held void in toto unless no other result is
possible from the words of the statute. Otherwise, blind and unreasoning forfeitures would
result in depriving one party of his entire
investment, or effort in performance, because
of some technical violation of statute, and reward the other, perhaps equally guilty party
with an undeserved and unearned benefit.
This probably explains the actual attitude of
the court which have considered various aspects of contracts which violate some statutory provision. Originally a distinction was
often drawn between statutes that were rnalum in se (contracts violating such statutes
were void); and those which were malum prohibitum (such contracts were not void); but
it is now recognized that whether a malum
prohibitum contract is void is to be determined from an examination of the statute
as a whole. Among the factors to be weighe~
are whether the enactment was passed primarily as a revenue measure or whether it was
a policing measure, and whether the statute
contains an express provision making the contract void. But the primary consideration, of
course, is what does the statute construed as
a whole indicate?
"Turning to our statute, we think it is appar10

ent that our Legislature intended to make
C?ntracts of insurance valid wherever possible. For example Section 31-19-35, UCA
53 reads:
"~ny ins~rance policy, * * * * * otherwise, vahd, which contains any condition or provision not in compliance with
the requirements of this code, shall not
be rendered invalid thereby, but shall be
construed and applied in accordance with
such conditions and provisions as would
have applied had such policy, rider, or
endorsement been in full compliance with
this code."
See also Kidder v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity
Company, 126 Wash. 475, 219 P. 220 at 221:
The appellant contends that under the Insurance Code of this state all insurance companies dealing in accident insurance were required to file with the insurance commissioner rate schedules or a manual of risks and a
copy of its form of policy that it had complied with the law, and that it could not obligate itself except upon the issuance of a written policy at the rate filed. In the case of Way
v. Pacific Lumber & Timber Co., 74 Wash.
332, 133 P. 595, 49 L.R.A. (N.S.) 147, there
was called in question the provisions of the
Insurance Code making it unlawful to sell insurance at less than the scheduled rate. It
was held in that case that error lies in the
assumption that the contract between the
agent and the insured was void, whereas the
rule is that a contract which violates a statutory regulation of itself is not void unless
made so by the terms of the act.
11

We quote from the Kidder case because there reference is made to the particular alleged violation of
the code, namely the failure to file a copy of the
form of the policy. The Utah Insurance Code does
not treat the failure to have a policy form approved
a serious violation. In fact, the authority of the
Commissioner to di~pprove a form is strictly limited by the provisions of 31-19-10 which reads:
31-19-10 - Restrictions upon right of commissioner to disapprove form. The commissioner shall disapprove any such form of insurance policy, application, rider or endorsement, or withdraw any previous approval
thereof, only
( 1) if it is in any respect in violation of or
does not comply with this code; or
(2) if it does not comply with any controlling filing theretofore made and approved; or
( 3) if it contains or incorporates by reference any inconsistent, ambiguous or misleading clauses, or exceptions and conditions which
unreasonably or deceptively affect the risk
purported to be assumed in the general coverage of the contract; or
( 4) if it has any title, heading, or other indication of its provisions which is likely to
mislead; or
( 5) if purchase of insurance thereunder is
being solicited by deceptive advertising.
Appellant concludes the discussion of Point 1-B
by referring to an allegation in plaintiff's complaint
which states "that the Utah Commissioner of Insur12

ance did not recognize the authority of the defendant Hackett to countersign policies on behalf of the
plaintiff, but nevertheless, the plaintiff was bound
to provide the coverage even though the defendant
Hackett was not authorized to countersign policies."
The only material part of that allegation is that
the policy did provide insurance coverage to Nielson.
That allegation cannot be tortured into an allegation or admission that the plaintiff insurance company did not have a certificate of authority to do
business in Utah. The allegation that the plaintiff
had such authority was pleaded (R-1) and not denied and it was not made an issue by the Pretrial
Order. ( R. 5) Appellant's entire discussion under
Point 1-B appears to be foreign to the issues in
this case.
DISCUSSION OF APPELLANT'S POINT 2 "THAT NO
CONTRACT OF INSURANCE WAS EVER CONSUMMATED GIVING RISE TO A CAUSE OF ACTION."

In our discussion under Point 1-(a) we have
already stated that the court in the instant case
made a finding that the insurance policy in question
became binding. Appellant in his argument on this
point in his Brief sets out approximately five pages
of testimony which he no doubt considers as establishing that no contract of insurance was ever consummated. It is Respondent's view that none of the
testimony is germane to the question as to whether
a policy of insurance became effective with the ex13

ception of the following evidence quoted by the defendant on Page 16:
"No, I didn't issue the binders. They would
happen, Mr. Arnovitz. I flew to Los Angeles
and met with their general agent on 1-24-58.
Mr. Blum and in a three-way conversation
between him and with myself listening on the
line to Mr. R. M. Bishop at the home office
in New York. Mr. Bishop as a result of that
telephone call, which I paid for, and the receipt of which is right here, caused a wire to
be sent to our office in Salt Lake City, saying
that they would bind the coverage pending receipt of the completed signed application on
the part of Nielson Trucking Co. for their
review and consideration."
The last sentence of that testimony is interesting in
that the defendant is there evidently trying to establish that the binder would be effective only "pending
receipt of the completed signed application on the
part of Nielson Trucking Company for their review and consideration". We include herewith the
testimony of the defendant which preceded that
statement and which followed it.
MR. ARN OVITZ:
State your name please?
George L. Hackett.
And are you the defendant in this action?
A. I am.
Q. Were you engaged in the i~surance b~si
ness as broker or agent durmg the period
October i, 1958 to April 30th, 1959?
BY
Q.
A.
Q.
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A.
Q.
A.
Q.

A.
Q.
A.

Q.

A.

Q.
A.
Q.

A.
Q.

A.
Q.
A.

Yes.
Under what name?
G. L. Hackett & Company.
In connection with the operation of that
business did you have occasion to contact Mr. Paul Nielson with respect to
writing insurance for him?
I did.
When did you first contact him?
Some part of the first, around the first
part of October, 1958?
And did you as a result of that conversation do anything about issuing binders
on public liability and property damage
on his fleet of trucks?
I did.
To whom did you issue the binders?
Nielson Trucking Co.
And to whom were the binders delivered?
There was a binder delivered to Nielson
Trucking Company and to certain states
in which the Nielson Trucking Company
operated.
Had you caused those binders to be delivered?
I did.
And in that connection did you contact
the Citizens Casualty Co. of New York,
the plaintiff in this action?
Contacting their general agent, Mr. Robert Blum.
15

Q.

And after contacting him did you receive
any communications like a telegram or
letter from Citizens Casualty Company
of New York?
A. I did.
Q. \Vill you produce those communications?
A. Yes.
Your Honor, I must have that in another file.
MR. MADSEN HERE,
A. Thanks. No, I didn't issue the binders.
They would happen, Mr. Arnovitz. I flew
to Los Angeles and met with their general agent on 10-24-58. Mr. Blum and
in a three-way conversation between him
and wiith myself listening on the line to
Mr. R. M. Bishop at the home office in
New York, Mr. Bishop as a result of that
telephone call, which I paid for, and the
receipt of which is right here, caused a
wire to be sent to our office in Salt Lake
City, saying that they would bind the
coverage pending receipt of the completed
signed application on the part of Nielson
Trucking Co. for their review and consideration.
Q. I see. And did you send in that application?
Q. Let me look at that?
A. I don't know if that's it. Let me look at
that and see if that is part of the file
here. I think it might be. Let's see. It
isn't here. This is the telephone call here.
It must be here.
16

Q.
A.

Let me ask you another question.
That application, Mr. Arnovitz, was sent
New York and I don't know if I ever
got it back. I do not find it in the file.
Q. And after that application went in and
binders had been sent, then what did you
do about collecting premiums on that
policy?
A. I didn't do anything about collecting premiums on that policy because the company had not advised us that their rate
would be, but on deposit of the rate that
we had with Nielson pending receipt of
the premium to be charged by company,
we waited for their information on what
those rates would be and receipt of a
policy. They had to formulate the rates
in New York. I had nothing to do with
that.
The defendant was not able to produce the alleged applications in response to counsel's demand
nor did he present from his files the telegram which
constituted the binder. Counsel for the Respondent
sometime later in the examination again inquired
whether Hackett could produce the telegrams and
Hackett stated that he had not been able to find
them but would continue to hunt them. Counsel for
Respondent then produced copies of the telegram
and Appellant acknowledged that Exhibit 14 was
a copy of the telegram binding this insurance. Nielson testified ( R-42) that after these telegrams were
sent that he operated in the various states without
any further requests for these states for him to post
17

evidence of liability and property damage insurance.
In response to a question placed by the court as to
whether this binder telegram satisfied the regulatory bodies in the states in which the trucking company operated, Nielson answered ( R-42) "it must
have done, otherwise, we would have notification.
The minute you are without insurance they usually
let you know 30 days before hand so that if you
are out of insurance you had better replace it or
quit running".
We have already quoted another interesting
part of the defendant's testimony which he offered
evidently to show that there was no policy in effect
and he stated: "I didn't do anything about collecting premiums on that policy, because the company
had not advised us what that rate would be - - - - ''.
( R-96) He made this statement after there had been
introduced in evidence checks showing payment to
him of over $9,000.00 in premiums on this policy.
The rest of the testimony quoted by Appellant's
Counsel to support the proposition that no policy of
insurance was ever consummated is actually testimony regarding the determination of the amount
of the premium and the collection of the premium.
It all appears immaterial in the light of the positive
fact that Hackett collected over $9,000.00 on that
insurance policy which his counsel now argues did
not become effective.
It is hardly necessary to comment upon the
authority cited by counsel to support the proposi18

tion that no insurance contract was consummated
other than to refer to the quoted portion of the authorities cited. The quotation from 29 Am. Jur. 587
at Section 196 simply states that there could not be
a contract of insurance without an acceptance, a
legal truism. Here the evidence is clear that there
was a binder and that Nielson accepted the policy.
We respectfully submit that a contract of insurance was consummated.
REPLY TO POINT 3 OF APPELLANT'S
ARGUMENT
There never was any issue in this case as to
whether any claims had been made under this policy
of insurance. A premium is due and payable when
a policy is effective regardless of whether a claim
is made under the policy. We see no materiality of
that discussion at Page 23 of Appellant's Brief.
Likewise, there is no issuance here as to the refund
of the premiums to the insured.
The remainder of Point 3 is not at all germane
to the headnote. We have already replied to that
part of Point 3 which appears on Pages 24, 25 and
26 of Appellant's Brief (Pages 5-7). In the final
paragraph, counsel for the Appellants makes a gratuitous statement on an issue which was not considered in the case at all, namely as to whether
Hackett would have had liability personally. The
reason it could not have been an issue is because
the plaintiff at all times recognized that it had
19

the liability of an insurer under this policy. Respondent's Counsel respectfully submits that he is unable to see how the fact that no claim was ever made
under this policy or the fact that Nielson did not
request Hackett to refund to him the more than
$9000.00 he paid to Hackett can effect the issue
in this case.
Appellant, under Point 3, challenges the Findmg of Fact which determines the amount of the
judgment in plaintiff's favor.
The Appellant's Brief at Page 26 claims
that this amount due to the plaintiff was "arrived
at by inference" but makes no effort to establish
that the finding of the court as to the amount due
to plaintiff is in any way erroneous.
Appellant there seeks to convey the impression
that the record does not support the findings as to
the amount of the premiums that defendant collected
on the policy in question. The court made a finding
that the defendant collected total premiums of
$5989. 70 on this policy. The fact is that the defendant Hackett collected a greater sum as premiums
on the policy of the Citizens Casualty Company than
the amount stated in the Findings of Fact. (Ex. P-1)
This is shown by a group of checks paid by Nielson
to Hackett totalling $9224.06 to be applied to the
policy in question and to the cargo policy of the
20

Firemen's Fund. These payments and their dates
follow:
October 3, 1958 Deposit Premium
$1000.00
December 23, 1958
689.60
December 23, 1958
391.95
January 9, 1959
689.63
January 10, 1959
689.63
January 10, 1959
1397.72
March 15, 1959
1560.32
March 31, 1959
1529.37
May 1, 1959
1275.84
Total

$9224.06

Since this sum of $9224.06 was the total of the premi urns paid on both the policy in question and the
cargo policy issued by Firemen's Fund, it is a simple
arithmetical calculation to deduct the amount of
the premiums paid on the cargo policy to arrive at
the amount paid on the policy in question. Exhibit
P-3, P-6 and D-7 show the original premium rate
on the Cargo policy at 50¢ per $100.00 of gross receipts. An endorsement added to Exhibit D-7 increases the rate to 60¢ per $100.00 of gross receipts,
Exhibit D-9 which is summarized on the adding
machine tape attached thereto shows the gross receipts during the period October 25, 1958 to April
1, 1959 to be $157,607.15. The 60¢ rate, therefore,
required the payment of $943.00 as the premium
on the cargo policy leaving $8281.06 as the premium
actually collected on this policy. The court made a
finding that $5989. 70 was collected on this policy.
21

This difference of $2291.36 between the facts as
just stated and the findings as made by the court,
is that at the Trial the Respondent did not take the
position that the deposit premium of $3068.86 was
to be applied as against this policy but instead took
the position that only $777.50 of that amount, on
deposit, or enough to cover the March premium,
should be considered as having been paid on the
Citizens Casualty policy ( R-10). The difference between these figures is as just stated, exactly
$2291.36. This demonstrates that not only is the
finding amply supported but the court could have
well made a finding that the defendant was chargeable with collecting $2291.36 more than he was
held liable for. We did not urge the court to charge
the defendant with this greater sum although the
court did make a finding (P-12) "That Nielson
Trucking Company paid the defendant, George
Hackett, a sum greater than $5289. 70 as owing for
the premiums on this policy of liability insurance."
The reason for our solicitude toward Hackett at
the time of the Trial for not requesting a judgment
for all of the monies he had received as premiums
on the Citizens Casualty policy was because Hackett
had not collected the full premium on the other policy
which supplanted the Citizens Casualty policy. That
successor liability and property damage policy was
written by Central Casualty after Citizens Casualty
cancelled.
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DISCUSSION OF APPELLANT'S POINT 4
Appellant quotes Section 31-19-21 (2) UCA
53 as authority for his conclusions that this binder
was invalid because no policy was delivered within
150 days. This section provides that the binder shall
be valid for 150 days from the effective date. The
statute is evidently a recognition of the fact that
at times it may be difficult to issue the policy before
the expiration of 150 days. To provide for such contingency, sub-division 3 of Section 31-19-31 UCA
53 provides:
( 3) If the policy has not been issued a binder
may be extended or renewed beyond such 150
days upon the commissioner's written approval, or in accordance with such rules and regulati'ons relative thereto as the commissioner
may promulgate.
On March 6, 1959, some 21 days before the expiration of the 150 day period, the plaintiff sent Nielson
Trucking Company a Notice of Cancellation. Nielson testified that the cancellation could not become
effective for a period of 30 days because the regulatory bodies of the states required a Notice of 30
days and therefore, it would have been futile to
issue a policy at that point since the Notice of Cancellation had already been sent out on March 6, 1959.
Clearly the binder was effective and was considered
effective both by the insurance company and by
the insured.
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POINT 5
PLAINTIFF FULLY MET ITS BURDEN OF
PROOF
Defendant complains that the plaintiff did not
meet its burden of proving the facts necessary to
establish a claim against the defendant. The evidence abundantly establishes that the plaintiff provided bodily injury liability and property damage
insurance to the Nielson Trucking Company; that
a binder was issued and accepted by the Nielson
Trucking Company; that the Nielson Trucking
Company acknowledged that it had the benefit of
this coverage; that Nielson paid Hackett for the
coverage in an amount in excess of the judgment;
that Hackett received the premiums and failed to
pay the premiums over to the plaintiff. Proof of
those facts provide all of the elements necessary to
establish a cause of action and to sustain the judgment.
Plaintiff pleaded in Paragraph 1 of its Complaint that "Plaintiff is an insurance corporation
of the State of New York and has a Certificate of
Authority from the State of Utah" (R-1) and defendant admitted the allegations of Paragraph 1 of
the complaint although he did allege a conclusion
of law that the certificate was not valid. The Certificate of Authority stated that the plaintiff had
authority to do business in the State of Utah. The
court recited in the Findings - "That the Pretrial
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Order did not make any issue as to plaintiff's authority to transact business in the State of Utah".
The Appellant did not object to the Pretrial
Order which was served on Mr. Madsen, counsel
for the Appellant, and that Pretrial Order set forth
that "The sole issue is whether or not defendant
has misappropriated monies to which the plaintiff
claims it is entitled to". Appellant misstates the
record when he states: "As also indicated heretofore, the undersigned, at the outset of the trial ref erred to the inconsistency of said Pretrial Order
and moved that the issues of fact be broadened sufficiently to include those raised by the pleadings
(Appellant's Brief - Page 28). Counsel's reference
is to Page 2 of his Brief where he stated: ''Counsel
for defendant also, at that time, made reference to
the Pretrial Order which reference is in part reported but not in its entirety ( R-32). We can agree
with counsel's later statement that he made refe1'ence to the Pretrial Order but that reference at the
Trial was simply the following statement by counsel for the Appellant: "We would like to make a
Motion that the court take judicial notice of the
proceedings held in this case, the Pre-trial that was
held in Judge Hansen's Office and other matters".
(R-32) Thus, it appears that counsel did not request
the Court to amend the Pretrial Order to include
other issues than the single issue set up in the order.
The only Motion made by Appellant's Counsel
was to consolidate three cases for Trial ( R-32 Line
10)
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"Mr. Madsen's Testimony: - I am asking the
court to take judicial notice of the record of this
same court. I think that this case and the two companion cases # 127044 and # 127263 should be tried
together. I am sure it would be correct for the court
to try these cases at one time".
The final paragraph of Appellant's Point 5
complains: "There is no evidence of any dealings
by the plaintiff with the State Insurance Commissioner". Having dealings with the Insurance Commissi'oner is not a prerequisite to recovery by the
plaintiff of monies belonging to the plaintiff and
misappropriated by the defendant. As either an
agent, solicitor or broker, one of which the defendant certainly was, he is guilty of larceny by embezzlement when, "not being lawfully entitled thereto, he appropriated such funds or any portion thereof to his own use". Section 31-17-22 (3) UCA 53.
Subdivision 2 of the same Section requires that all
funds representing premiums received by an agent
shall be held by him in his fiduciary capacity and
shall be promptly accounted for and paid to the
company, just as it requires that return premiums
shall be held in his fiduciary capacity and returned
to the insured.
We respectfully submit that the plaintiff has
met the burden of proof as abundantly appears from
the transcript of evidence.
26

!

CONCLUSION
We regret that the inaccuracy with respect to
the Statement of Facts in the Appellant's Brief has
required us to lengthen the Statement of Fact. The
facts all boil down to this: That the plaintiff insurance company issued its policy of insurance to the
Nielson Trucking Company through the George
Hackett Insurance Agency; that the policy provided
coverage to the Nielson Trucking Company for a
given period of time; that an insurance premium
of $5989. 70 accrued on this policy; that George L.
Hackett, the agent, collected an amount in excess
of $5989. 70 as insurance premiums on this policy;
that he did not remit the insurance premium to the
Citizens Casualty Company; that the Citizens casualty Company is entitled to that sum of $5989.70
less a commission earned by Hackett of $1317.7 4 or
a net sum of $4671.96.
We respectfully submit that there is no reason
in law why Hackett should not be obliged to remit
the sum of $4671.96 to the Citizens Casualty Company and that the judgment of the Lower Court
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
IRWIN ARNOVITZ
WHITE, ARNOVITZ & SMITH
913 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for
Plain ti/f and Respondent
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